EAdIElection Administration Index

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute codifies a right to judicial review of a board of recount's decisions with all four required elements clearly defined: standing ('any person aggrieved'), timeline ('within 5 days thereafter'), venue ('superior court for the county in which such town is located'), and scope ('jurisdiction in equity to hear and determine'). This provides clear statutory protection against arbitrary administrative action in the recount context.

“Any person aggrieved by a ruling of the board of recount with respect to any ballot may, within 5 days thereafter, appeal to the superior court for the county in which such town is located; and such court shall have jurisdiction in equity to hear and determine the question presented.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The redistricting commission is grounded in statute (N.H. Rev. Stat. § 662-A:4), not in the New Hampshire Constitution. The section establishes clear statutory authority for the commission's existence, membership, appointment process, and core mandate (redistricting), but COMM.1 specifically requires constitutional grounding. Statutory grounding alone scores 1 under the ordinal scale (0=executive, 1=statute, 2=constitution).

The statute establishes statutory multi-branch appointment: the speaker of the house appoints 2 members (one per major party), the president of the senate appoints 2 members (one per major party), and the governor appoints 1 member with council advice and consent. This fragmented structure prevents any single branch from unilaterally controlling the 5-member composition, and partisan balance is guaranteed by statute.

“Two members shall be appointed by the speaker of the house of representatives, one from each of the 2 major political parties in the state based on votes cast for governor in the most recent state general election. Two members shall be appointed by the president of the senate, one from each of the 2 major political parties in the state based on votes cast for governor in the most recent state general election. One member shall be appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the council”

This section establishes statutory term lengths (2-year and 4-year terms) and staggered cycles for county commissioners and other county officials. However, it does not address statutory grounds for removal—a critical safeguard against arbitrary removal. The section defines term structure but lacks removal protections that would complete the criterion.

“At every state general election, the following officers shall be elected for 2-year terms except as otherwise provided”

The statute mandates explicit party-balance through multi-branch appointment: the House Speaker and Senate President each appoint one member from each of the two major parties (4 members, 2-2 balanced), and the Governor appoints one member with executive council consent. This creates a structural requirement that no single party can control the commission, and the staggered terms (2, 3, 4 years) prevent wholesale turnover.

“Two members shall be appointed by the speaker of the house of representatives, one from each of the 2 major political parties in the state based on votes cast for governor in the most recent state general election. Two members shall be appointed by the president of the senate, one from each of the 2 major political parties in the state based on votes cast for governor in the most recent state general election. One member shall be appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the council”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses campaign contribution limits and restrictions on political donations—it is entirely outside the scope of election authority funding. It contains no provisions about the election authority's budget, budgetary structure, line items, appropriations, or protection from executive reallocation. FUND.1 requires statutory grounding for independent election administration funding; this section does not address that topic.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses procedures for filling vacancies in elective offices (executive councilor, state senator, state representative) and the timing of special elections. It contains no provisions regarding election infrastructure budgets, funding cycles, or multi-year appropriations for election administration. The criterion evaluates whether budgets are set on a multi-year basis to shield election administration from annual political renegotiation; this section is silent on funding structure entirely.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 664:5 addresses prohibited political expenditures by candidates, parties, and political committees—it regulates campaign finance, not election authority funding. FUND.3 requires statutory prohibition of foreign-source funding of the election authority itself and its vendors. This section does not establish any mechanism for, or prohibition on, foreign funding of election administration infrastructure, staff, or contracted services. It is outside the scope of institutional structure for election authorities.

No matching sections in corpus.

This section requires training for audit team members specifically in the audit process and equipment, but only for personnel involved in post-election audits—a narrow subset of election administration. It does not establish a mandatory training regime for the broader population of election officials and poll workers who conduct voting operations on election day, nor does it specify training content or frequency for general election administration duties.

“One such individual shall have been trained by the secretary of state in the audit process and the use of audit equipment.”

No matching sections in corpus.

The section codifies vendor regulatory authority and compliance obligations (designating agents, permitting inspections, testing protocols, liability for miscounts), but does not establish a formal certification process with defined criteria, evaluators, public-comment procedures, or timelines for initial equipment approval. The Ballot Law Commission is granted rulemaking authority over testing and device use, but this statute does not codify the certification criteria, timeline, or public process itself—only vendor accountability after deployment.

“III. Any company, partnership, proprietorship, or other person, wherever located, which supplies, maintains, or programs electronic ballot counting devices which are used in elections in New Hampshire is subject to regulation by this state. IV. Each person described in paragraph III shall designate, in writing, an agent for service of all process, including, but not limited to summonses, writs, orders, petitions, and subpoenas, and shall agree in writing that the attorney general, in conjunction with any election investigation, may inspect its records, machines or other devices, and premises.”

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.