EIIElection Integrity Index
How well does the legal framework defend against vote-altering attacks?
Dimensions
Citizen Verifiability
0.0% · 0/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 4.1Public verification artifactDoes law mandate a downloadable public package containing certificates, device records, and result signatures? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-17 |
| 4.2End-to-end verifiability permittedDoes law permit (or require) per-voter cryptographic receipts that prove inclusion without revealing the vote? | 0/50.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-17 |
| 4.3Voter-verifiable paper trailIs voter-verifiable paper record (VVPAT or hand-marked paper) legally required? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-17 |
| 4.4Citizen re-tally rightCan any citizen — not just parties — legally re-tally from published precinct data? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section is a definitions/interpretation clause that defines key terms used throughout the electoral law (such as 'voter,' 'election,' 'electoral district,' 'candidate,' etc.). It does not address citizen rights to re-tally votes from published precinct data, ballot transparency, verification procedures, or any mechanism for independent verification of election results. The section is entirely definitional in nature and is irrelevant to the criterion. | § view source 2026-06-17 |
Custody Hardware
0.0% · 0/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.1Hardware tamper standardAre tamper-evident or tamper-responsive hardware standards mandated? | 0/50.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-17 |
| 2.2Network isolation mandateIs internet/Wi-Fi/cellular connectivity legally prohibited on vote-casting equipment? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-17 |
| 2.3Custody documentationIs full chain-of-custody documentation required and publicly available? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-17 |
| 2.4Tamper criminal penaltyAre there explicit criminal penalties for unauthorized device access? | 0/10.0% | The section criminalizes unauthorized tampering with ballot boxes and ballot bundles used in elections, imposing up to six months imprisonment or a fine of up to £450. However, the criterion asks specifically about 'device access,' which in the context of election hardware typically refers to electronic voting systems or counting equipment, not physical ballot boxes. The statute addresses ballot tampering but does not explicitly address electronic device access or cybersecurity-related unauthorized access. “άνευ εξουσίας καταστρέφει, λαμβάνει, ανοίγει ή άλλως επεμβαίνει επί οιασδήποτε κάλπης ή δέσμης ψηφοδελτίων εν χρήσει ή προτιθεμένων όπως χρησιμοποιηθούν διά τους σκοπούς εκλογής” | § view source 2026-06-17 |
Post Election Audit
0.0% · 0/9| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1Mandatory auditIs a post-election audit legally required for every election? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-17 |
| 3.2Audit methodWhat audit method is mandated? | 0/50.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-17 |
| 3.3Audit triggers beyond mandatoryDoes law trigger additional audits on close margins or sworn challenges? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-17 |
| 3.4Public observation of auditAre parties, media, and citizens granted observer access to the audit? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-17 |
| 3.5Binding forceAre audit results legally binding on the final certified result? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-17 |
Software Verifiability
0.0% · 0/9| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1.1Source code disclosureIs voting system source code legally accessible? | 0/50.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-17 |
| 1.2Reproducible builds requirementMust the binary that runs in production be reproducibly buildable from public source? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-17 |
| 1.3Pre-election binary commitmentIs the running binary cryptographically committed (hash published) before polls open? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-17 |
| 1.4Election definition publicationAre ballot contests, layouts, and tabulation rules signed and published before polls open? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-17 |
| 1.5Post-election integrity checkDoes law grant a right to verify the actual running binary matches the committed one? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-17 |
Transparency Observation
0.0% · 0/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 6.1Domestic observer rightsAre party and civil-society observers given full procedural access? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-17 |
| 6.2International observer accessAre OSCE/EU/IFES international observers admitted by default? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-17 |
| 6.3Precinct-level results publication speedAre precinct-level results legally required to be published within 24h of poll close? | 0/50.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-17 |
| 6.4Public election event logIs a public, signed, append-only election event log legally required? | 0/10.0% | The section requires the election officer to compile a detailed tally statement immediately after vote counting, recording specific numerical results. However, the statute does not explicitly mandate that this record be public, signed, or maintained as an append-only log. While the transparency framework requires candidate observation during counting, it does not establish a legally required public append-only event log with cryptographic integrity. | § view source 2026-06-17 |
Vendor Independence
0.0% · 0/4| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 5.1Multi-vendor capabilityDoes law permit multiple certified vendors to operate in the same election? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-17 |
| 5.2Open protocol standardsAre vote-format / device-protocol standards open and publicly documented? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-17 |
| 5.3Contract duration capAre vendor contracts capped in duration, preventing perpetual lock-in? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-17 |
| 5.4Source-code escrowIs source-code escrow with the state required as a condition of certification? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-17 |
Voter Access
42.9% · 3/7| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 7.1Ballot secrecy guaranteeIs voter–ballot unlinkability legally guaranteed and enforceable? | 1/1100.0% | The section explicitly requires that voters proceed to a designated area where they secretly mark their ballot in private ('μυστικώς'), which directly guarantees ballot secrecy and prevents linkage between voter identity and their ballot choice. This is a binding legal obligation established in the statute. “Ο εκλογεύς επί τη λήψει του ψηφοδελτίου προχωρεί προς το επί τούτω ορισθέν μέρος ένθα μυστικώς σημειοί επί του ψηφοδελτίου” | § view source 2026-06-17 |
| 7.2Accessibility mandateAre accessibility standards (vision, motor, language) legally required at every polling place? | 2/540.0% | Section 29(7) addresses accessibility for blind and disabled voters by permitting them to vote alone or with assistance of their choice, and allows the Commissioner to arrange technology and equipment where necessary. However, the provisions are discretionary rather than mandatory at every polling place, and they focus on procedural accommodations rather than establishing comprehensive accessibility standards that must be present at all polling locations. “Τυφλός ή ανίκανος εκλογέας μπορεί να ψηφίσει μόνος του, αν το επιθυμεί, δηλώνοντας ότι είναι σε θέση να το πράξει.” | § view source 2026-06-17 |
| 7.3Polling-place density floorIs there a legal floor on polling places per N voters or per geographic area? | 0/10.0% | The statute establishes a minimum of thirty voters per polling center ('τουλάχιστον τριάντα εκλογείς'), which is a floor on voter density per polling place. However, this is an inverse metric—it sets a minimum number of voters per center rather than a maximum (i.e., a floor on poll density, not a ceiling on voters per location). This does not clearly establish a traditional polling-place density floor (minimum number of centers per voter population or per geographic area). The provision addresses voter allocation to centers rather than requiring a minimum number of centers for a given population or area. | § view source 2026-06-17 |