EIIElection Integrity Index
How well does the legal framework defend against vote-altering attacks?
Dimensions
Citizen Verifiability
12.5% · 1/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 4.1Public verification artifactDoes law mandate a downloadable public package containing certificates, device records, and result signatures? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 28 addresses campaign periods and restrictions on electoral publicity during specific time windows. It contains no provisions regarding public verification artifacts, downloadable packages, certificates, device records, or result signatures—topics entirely unrelated to the section's scope of regulating campaign messaging timing. | § view source 2026-06-16 |
| 4.2End-to-end verifiability permittedDoes law permit (or require) per-voter cryptographic receipts that prove inclusion without revealing the vote? | 0/50.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-16 |
| 4.3Voter-verifiable paper trailIs voter-verifiable paper record (VVPAT or hand-marked paper) legally required? | 1/1100.0% | The section requires voters unable to visit polling stations due to illness or disability to fold their marked ballot paper, place it in a special envelope, and seal it. This creates a voter-verifiable paper trail by mandating that the voter personally handles and verifies their marked ballot before it is placed in the ballot box. “Birač iz stavka 2. ovoga članka dužan je najmanje jedanput presaviti glasački listić na kojem je glasovao, staviti ga u posebnu omotnicu i zatvoriti je.” | § view source 2026-06-16 |
| 4.4Citizen re-tally rightCan any citizen — not just parties — legally re-tally from published precinct data? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses campaign financing disclosure requirements and does not concern vote tallying, precinct data publication, or citizen re-tally rights. It mandates that candidates disclose the sources and amounts of their campaign spending, which is unrelated to the criterion's focus on citizen ability to independently verify election results from published precinct-level voting data. | § view source 2026-06-16 |
Custody Hardware
0.0% · 0/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.1Hardware tamper standardAre tamper-evident or tamper-responsive hardware standards mandated? | 0/50.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-16 |
| 2.2Network isolation mandateIs internet/Wi-Fi/cellular connectivity legally prohibited on vote-casting equipment? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the financing and oversight of election costs by the State Electoral Commission, including public reporting of election expenses. It contains no provisions regarding network isolation, internet connectivity restrictions, or technical specifications for vote-casting equipment. | § view source 2026-06-16 |
| 2.3Custody documentationIs full chain-of-custody documentation required and publicly available? | 0/10.0% | The section requires municipal/city electoral commissions to maintain a record (zapisnik) of their work documenting voter numbers, ballot counts, and results. However, the statute does not explicitly address full chain-of-custody documentation (tracking the movement and handling of ballots/materials through all stages) or public availability of such documentation. The requirement is limited to record-keeping and delivery of materials to the unit electoral commission. “O svom radu općinsko, odnosno gradsko izborno povjerenstvo vodi zapisnik u koji će ubilježiti:” | § view source 2026-06-16 |
| 2.4Tamper criminal penaltyAre there explicit criminal penalties for unauthorized device access? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 9 of the Croatian Law on Elections to the Parliament addresses eligibility requirements and disqualifications for parliamentary candidates based on criminal convictions and incompatible positions. It contains no provisions regarding unauthorized device access, tampering with electoral hardware, or criminal penalties for such conduct. The section is entirely focused on candidate eligibility rules, not cybersecurity or equipment tampering. | § view source 2026-06-16 |
Post Election Audit
0.0% · 0/9| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1Mandatory auditIs a post-election audit legally required for every election? | 0/10.0% | The section establishes oversight bodies (the State Electoral Commission and State Audit Office) with mandates to conduct financial audits and supervision of political parties and electoral campaign financing. However, it does not explicitly require a mandatory post-election audit for every election—it focuses on supervision of financial accounts, campaign financing, and annual financial reports rather than a comprehensive mandatory audit of the election itself. | § view source 2026-06-16 |
| 3.2Audit methodWhat audit method is mandated? | 0/50.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-16 |
| 3.3Audit triggers beyond mandatoryDoes law trigger additional audits on close margins or sworn challenges? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 100 addresses the complaint and appeal procedures to the Constitutional Court regarding decisions by the State Electoral Commission, with specific timeframes for filing and deciding appeals. It does not establish or trigger additional audits based on close margins or sworn challenges; it merely provides a dispute resolution mechanism for existing State Electoral Commission decisions. | § view source 2026-06-16 |
| 3.4Public observation of auditAre parties, media, and citizens granted observer access to the audit? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 28 regulates the timing and content restrictions of electoral campaign activities and the prohibition on publishing election results and candidate statements around election day. It does not address post-election audits, observer access to audits, or any procedures for verifying election integrity after voting concludes. | § view source 2026-06-16 |
| 3.5Binding forceAre audit results legally binding on the final certified result? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 73 contains only a heading indicating the section was deleted ('Brisan') and does not contain substantive provisions regarding audit results or their binding force on certified election results. The section does not address the criterion at all. | § view source 2026-06-16 |
Software Verifiability
0.0% · 0/9| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1.1Source code disclosureIs voting system source code legally accessible? | 0/50.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-16 |
| 1.2Reproducible builds requirementMust the binary that runs in production be reproducibly buildable from public source? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-16 |
| 1.3Pre-election binary commitmentIs the running binary cryptographically committed (hash published) before polls open? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section regulates the recordkeeping and reporting procedures of electoral commissions at the electoral district level, including documentation of voter turnout, vote counts, and candidate results. It contains no reference to software, cryptographic commitments, hashing, binary code, or any pre-election technical verification mechanisms. | § view source 2026-06-16 |
| 1.4Election definition publicationAre ballot contests, layouts, and tabulation rules signed and published before polls open? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the definition of invalid ballots under Croatian electoral law but contains no information regarding publication, signing, or pre-election disclosure of ballot contests, layouts, or tabulation rules. It is substantively unrelated to the criterion's requirement for signed and published election definitions before polls open. | § view source 2026-06-16 |
| 1.5Post-election integrity checkDoes law grant a right to verify the actual running binary matches the committed one? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses oversight bodies and their authority to monitor political party financing, election campaign financing, and conduct audits. It does not address software, binary code verification, or any form of technological integrity checking of election systems. The criterion concerns post-election verification of software binaries, which is entirely outside the scope of this provision on financial oversight. | § view source 2026-06-16 |
Transparency Observation
12.5% · 1/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 6.1Domestic observer rightsAre party and civil-society observers given full procedural access? | 1/1100.0% | The statute grants domestic observers (including party observers, voter observers, and NGO observers) comprehensive procedural access encompassing the entire election process, specifically including voting, electoral bodies' operations, and access to all election materials. This clearly satisfies the criterion of full procedural access for domestic observers. | § view source 2026-06-16 |
| 6.2International observer accessAre OSCE/EU/IFES international observers admitted by default? | 0/10.0% | The section establishes that international organization observers (promatrači međunarodnih organizacija) have the right to observe elections, but does not specify OSCE/EU/IFES by name or establish automatic admission by default. The provision allows observation by international organizations operating in Croatia, which may include OSCE/EU observers, but does not guarantee their admission as a matter of course. “promatrači međunarodnih organizacija koje djeluju u Republici Hrvatskoj” | § view source 2026-06-16 |
| 6.3Precinct-level results publication speedAre precinct-level results legally required to be published within 24h of poll close? | 0/50.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses reimbursement timelines for political financing (60 days after publication of final election results), not precinct-level results publication speed. It is irrelevant to the criterion asking whether precinct-level results must be published within 24 hours of poll closure. | § view source 2026-06-16 |
| 6.4Public election event logIs a public, signed, append-only election event log legally required? | 0/10.0% | The section requires polling station boards to submit a record of their work to municipal/city election commissions within 12 hours. While this creates a documented election record (zapisnik), the statute does not explicitly mandate that this log be publicly accessible, digitally append-only, or formally signed in the sense required for a true public election event log. “Birački odbor dostavlja zapisnik o svom radu s ostalim izbornim materijalom općinskom ili gradskom izbornom povjerenstvu, najkasnije u roku od 12 sati od zatvaranja birališta.” | § view source 2026-06-16 |
Vendor Independence
0.0% · 0/4| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 5.1Multi-vendor capabilityDoes law permit multiple certified vendors to operate in the same election? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses financial reporting and asset return obligations for independent representatives and members of local/regional bodies after their mandates end. It contains no provisions regarding certified vendors, election systems, or multi-vendor capability in elections. The section is entirely focused on campaign finance and accounting matters, not vendor management or election administration infrastructure. | § view source 2026-06-16 |
| 5.2Open protocol standardsAre vote-format / device-protocol standards open and publicly documented? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-16 |
| 5.3Contract duration capAre vendor contracts capped in duration, preventing perpetual lock-in? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section of Croatian electoral financing law addresses sources of campaign financing, disclosure of media advertising prices and discounts, and vendor pricing transparency obligations. It does not contain any provisions regarding contract duration caps or limitations on vendor lock-in periods. | § view source 2026-06-16 |
| 5.4Source-code escrowIs source-code escrow with the state required as a condition of certification? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-16 |
Voter Access
42.9% · 3/7| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 7.1Ballot secrecy guaranteeIs voter–ballot unlinkability legally guaranteed and enforceable? | 1/1100.0% | The section explicitly guarantees the freedom of voter choice and the secrecy of voting, establishing that ballot secrecy is legally guaranteed. The provision also prohibits anyone from requiring voters to disclose their voting choice and protects voters from accountability based on their voting decision, which reinforces voter-ballot unlinkability and enforceability. “Jamči se sloboda opredjeljenja birača i tajnost njihova glasovanja.” | § view source 2026-06-16 |
| 7.2Accessibility mandateAre accessibility standards (vision, motor, language) legally required at every polling place? | 2/540.0% | The section addresses accessibility for voters with physical disabilities or literacy issues by permitting them to bring an assistant to help them vote. However, it does not establish mandatory accessibility standards that polling places themselves must meet (such as ramps, accessible voting machines, or visual aids). Instead, it provides accommodations through assistance and out-of-polling-place voting for those with disabilities or illness, which is reactive rather than proactive universal design. The provision does not comprehensively cover accessibility standards. “Birač koji zbog kakve tjelesne mane ili zbog toga što je nepismen ne bi mogao glasovati na način predviđen ovim Zakonom, može doći na biračko mjesto s drugom osobom koja je pismena i koja će po njegovoj ovlasti i uputi zaokružiti odgovor.” | § view source 2026-06-16 |
| 7.3Polling-place density floorIs there a legal floor on polling places per N voters or per geographic area? | 0/10.0% | The statute requires that the number of voters per polling place be determined so that voting can proceed without difficulties within the allocated voting period. However, this establishes a procedural principle tied to voting efficiency rather than a concrete legal floor (minimum density threshold) expressed as a specific number of polling places per N voters or per geographic area. It does not mandate minimum polling-place density. “Broj birača koji će glasovati na jednom biračkom mjestu odredit će se na način da se glasovanje bez poteškoća može odvijati u vremenu određenom za glasovanje.” | § view source 2026-06-16 |