EAdIElection Administration Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section prescribes campaign finance disclosure requirements for candidates and political committees, not conflict-of-interest disclosure for election commissioners or senior election staff. It does not address whether commissioners or election staff must disclose personal financial interests, vendor relationships, or party affiliations. COI.1 requires statutory mandates for commissioner/staff disclosure; this section governs campaign finance transparency, a different accountability mechanism.

The statute codifies a clear right to judicial review of election-official decisions and ballot-count disputes, establishes standing ('any person' claiming to be aggrieved), defines venue (Superior Court), and sets a specific timeline (30 days post-referendum for complaints after the event, with expedited hearing requirements of 3–5 days for notice and hearing). The statute further mandates notice to the Secretary of State and State Elections Enforcement Commission, ensuring transparency and multi-party participation in judicial proceedings.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section governs polling place hours and locations for primary elections. It contains no provision whatsoever regarding the existence, structure, mandate, or constitutional grounding of an election commission. The section is purely operational/procedural and does not address the institutional framework through which election administration occurs.

The statute explicitly mandates multi-branch appointment: three members appointed by legislative branch leaders (minority and majority from both chambers), one by the Governor (executive), and balanced composition (no more than two from same party, at least one unaffiliated). No single branch controls composition. The structure includes Senate confirmation of all appointments, fixed staggered terms, and a political-balance requirement—all codified safeguards against single-party capture.

“Of the members first appointed under this subsection, one shall be appointed by the minority leader of the House of Representatives and shall hold office for a term of one year from July 1, 1974; one shall be appointed by the minority leader of the Senate and shall hold office for a term of three years from said July first; one shall be appointed by the speaker of the House of Representatives and shall hold office for a term of one year from said July first; one shall be appointed by the president pro tempore of the Senate and shall hold office for a term of three years from said July first and one shall be appointed by the Governor, provided such member shall not be affiliated with any political party, and shall hold office for a term of five years from said July first”

The statute explicitly defines a six-year fixed term for board of finance members, establishes a staggered rotation system (two members elected each cycle), and specifies statutory tenure protection ('shall serve for the term for which he is elected and until his successor is elected and has qualified'). Term length, staggered cycles, and statutory grounds for tenure are all clearly codified.

“At each such election thereafter, the town shall elect, in the same manner as the town officers are elected, two electors of such town as members of such board of finance to serve for six years. Each member of the board of finance shall serve for the term for which he is elected and until his successor is elected and has qualified.”

Connecticut law establishes by statute a five-member commission with explicit political-balance requirements: no more than two members from the same party, and at least one member unaffiliated with any party. This structure is further reinforced by multi-branch appointment (House minority leader, Senate minority leader, Speaker, President pro tempore, and the Governor), ensuring neither party can control commission composition. The statute also bars recent political-party officers from appointment, protecting institutional independence from short-term partisan pressure.

“There is established a State Elections Enforcement Commission to consist of five members, not more than two of whom shall be members of the same political party and at least one of whom shall not be affiliated with any political party.”

Section 9-7c(b) provides explicit statutory protection against executive-branch mid-cycle reallocation by prohibiting the Governor from reducing allotments for the Commission. Section 9-7c(a) further establishes that budget recommendations originate from the Commission's executive director, not the executive branch, creating structural independence in the budget-formulation process. This is a clear statutory safeguard against unilateral executive reduction during the fiscal year.

“the Governor shall not reduce allotment requisitions or allotments in force concerning the State Elections Enforcement Commission”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section governs school board election terms and rotation schedules, not election administration funding or budgets. It contains no provisions regarding multi-year funding cycles, budget authority, or financial independence for election infrastructure. The criterion concerns statutory protection of election-administration budgets from annual political renegotiation; this section addresses only the structure of school board member elections.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 9-622 prohibits foreign nationals from making contributions or expenditures in elections, and prohibits soliciting contributions from foreign nationals. However, this section addresses campaign finance and illegal electoral practices, not the funding of the election authority itself or election administration vendors. FUND.3 specifically asks whether foreign-source funding of the election administration agency is prohibited by statute. This section does not address election administration funding structures, agency appropriations, or vendor procurement—it regulates candidate and political party fundraising. The criterion is not satisfied by this provision.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section regulates absentee ballot application procedures and eligible categories of voters. It contains no language regarding election authority staff, civil service protections, merit-based employment, or personnel administration. The criterion requires statutory protection of career professional staff through civil-service or merit-based provisions, which this section does not address.

Connecticut General Statutes § 9-192a provides clear statutory requirements for mandatory training of election officials (registrars). The statute mandates not less than eight hours of annual training for certified registrars to maintain certification, with specific content requirements (including early voting procedures as of 2024) and approval authority vested in the Secretary of the State. Additionally, subsection (d) requires the advisory committee to develop training programs for poll workers and registrars, which the Secretary must approve or modify. Both the frequency (annual, minimum eight hours) and content are statutorily defined.

“Once certified, pursuant to subdivision (1) of this subsection, each registrar shall participate each year in not less than eight hours of training, not including any training described under subdivision (2) of subsection (d) of this section, in order to maintain such certification. Such training shall be as prescribed by the Secretary of the State and shall be conducted by said Secretary or a third party approved by said Secretary to conduct such training. On and after January 1, 2024, such training shall include procedures for the conduct of early voting at elections and primaries.”

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute codifies that the Secretary of State must examine tabulators and apply defined criteria (meeting section 9-242 requirements, usability at elections, compliance with electronic voting standards). However, the section lacks statutory codification of key procedural elements: no mandatory timeline for examination and approval, no public-comment period, no detailed evaluation methodology, and the Secretary retains broad discretion ("in the Secretary's opinion"). The delegation to regulations ("may adopt regulations") and to university partners (subsection b) for standard-development suggests further proceduralization occurs outside the statute itself, reducing statutory completeness.

“The Secretary of the State shall examine the tabulator and determine whether, in the Secretary's opinion, the kind of tabulator so examined (1) meets the requirements of section 9-242 , (2) can be used at elections, primaries and referenda held pursuant to this title, and (3) complies with applicable standards for electronic voting tabulators.”

Connecticut statute clearly codifies a fixed-schedule recertification trigger for regional election advisors: certifications expire every two years, and renewal requires completion of an abridged recertification process prescribed by the Secretary. This satisfies the fixed-schedule component of CERT.2. The statute also provides for revocation 'with or without cause, at any time,' creating a mechanism for response to defects or material changes.

“Any such initial certification granted under this subdivision shall expire two years after the date of such granting. Prior to expiration of the initial or any subsequent certification, a regional election advisor may undergo an abridged recertification process prescribed by the Secretary, and upon successful completion thereof, such certification shall be renewed for two years after the date of such completion.”

The statute defines grounds for re-examination when tabulator alterations materially affect accuracy or functionality, and grants the Secretary discretion to require inspection before continued use. However, the section does not explicitly define a formal decertification procedure or grounds for revoking an already-approved tabulator's certification status. The mechanism addresses alteration review but lacks statutory procedures for permanent decertification, rescission of approval, or removal from the approved list.

“If any such alterations appear to materially affect the accuracy, appearance or efficiency of the tabulator, or modify the tabulator so that it can no longer be used at elections, primaries or referenda held pursuant to this title, at the discretion of the Secretary of the State, the company shall submit such alterations for inspection and approval, at its own expense, before such altered tabulators may be used.”