EIIElection Integrity Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses provisional ballot casting procedures and voter verification of whether their specific ballot was counted, but does not mandate a downloadable public package containing certificates, device records, and result signatures. It concerns individual voter verification of provisional ballot status, not public cryptographic artifacts or election result signatures.

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute explicitly requires direct recording electronic voting tabulators to produce 'individual, permanent, voter-verified, paper records contemporaneously produced' and mandates manual tallies of these records during recanvasses. This establishes a legal requirement for voter-verifiable paper records.

“conduct a manual tally of the individual, permanent, voter-verified, paper records contemporaneously produced by each direct recording electronic voting tabulator”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses moderator and municipal clerk duties regarding recording, counting, declaring, preserving, and destroying absentee ballots and related materials. It does not address citizen rights to conduct independent re-tallies from published precinct data. The statute governs official procedures and document preservation, not public access rights or citizen verification procedures.

The statute requires seals for voting tabulators, which is a tamper-evident measure, but does not specify technical standards, logging requirements, or tamper-responsive features such as auto-quarantine. The requirement is basic physical sealing without additional safeguards.

“two seals for sealing the tabulator”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the development of recanvass training videos and procedures for conducting recounts after an election. It has no bearing on whether internet, Wi-Fi, or cellular connectivity is prohibited on vote-casting equipment. The statute is about post-election administration and training, not equipment specifications or network isolation requirements.

The statute requires written reports documenting tabulator condition and sealing procedures, and mandates a report of repairs made on election day. However, it does not explicitly require a full chain-of-custody documentation tracking the movement and handling of tabulators throughout the election process, nor does it specify that such documentation must be made publicly available.

“The registrar or registrars shall file a written report of the condition of each tabulator certifying that (1) they have prepared the tabulators, (2) all the counters are set at zero (000), (3) the ballot is properly prepared, (4) the tabulator has been properly adjusted according to the ballots, and (5) each tabulator is otherwise in readiness for the election.”

The statute explicitly establishes criminal penalties for unauthorized tampering with voting tabulators and related devices. Any person who is not an election official and tampers with, disarranges, defaces, injures, or impairs a voting tabulator or ballot is guilty of a class C felony, directly satisfying the criterion for explicit criminal penalties for unauthorized device access.

“Any person, not being an election official, who, with intent to cause or permit any ballot, voting tabulator or other appliance used in connection with such tabulator to fail to correctly register any vote cast upon such ballot, tabulator or other appliance, during any election or before any election, tampers with a voting tabulator, disarranges, defaces, injures or impairs the same in any manner, or mutilates, injures or destroys any ballot or any other appliance used in connection with such tabulator, shall be guilty of a class C felony.”

The statute uses mandatory language ('shall conduct') requiring registrars to perform audits after every federal, state, and municipal election or primary within specified timeframes. The audit covers at least five percent of voting districts and specific offices, making post-election audits legally mandatory statewide.

“Not earlier than the fifteenth day after any federal or state election or primary and not later than two business days before the canvass of votes by the Secretary of the State, Treasurer and Comptroller, and (2) not earlier than the fifth day after any municipal election or primary and not later than two business days before the canvass of votes by the town clerk, the registrars of voters shall conduct a manual audit, or an electronic audit authorized under section 9-320g , of the votes recorded in not less than five per cent of the voting districts in the state, district or municipality, whichever is applicable.”

Connecticut law mandates a manual audit (hand recount) of a fixed percentage (not less than 5%) of voting districts. This is a fixed-percentage hand recount audit method, which corresponds to scoring level 2 under the ordinal scale. The statute does not require risk-limiting audits or comparison audits.

“the registrars of voters shall conduct a manual audit, or an electronic audit authorized under section 9-320g , of the votes recorded in not less than five per cent of the voting districts in the state, district or municipality”

The statute mandates a discrepancy recanvass when specific conditions are met, including when the margin of victory is less than the discrepancy multiplied by the total voting districts. This triggers an additional audit mechanism beyond the mandatory baseline 5% audit, satisfying the criterion for audits triggered by close margins.

“the Secretary of the State shall order a discrepancy recanvass of the returns of an election or primary for any office if a discrepancy, as defined in subsection (o) of this section, exists where the margin of victory in the race for such office is less than the amount of the discrepancy multiplied by the total number of voting districts where such race appeared on the ballot”

The statute explicitly requires that manual or electronic audits of votes be noticed in advance and open to public observation, which directly satisfies the criterion of granting parties, media, and citizens observer access to the audit.

“Such manual or electronic audit shall be noticed in advance and be open to public observation.”

The statute explicitly mandates that manual audit results (paper record tallies) shall be used as 'the official record for purposes of declaring the official election results' when they do not reconcile with electronic tabulations. This makes audit findings legally binding on the final certified result.

“If the manual tabulation of such contemporaneously produced paper records does not reconcile with the electronic vote tabulation of a particular direct recording electronic voting tabulator or tabulators, such contemporaneously produced paper records shall be considered the true and correct record of each elector's vote on such electronic voting tabulator or tabulators and shall be used as the official record for purposes of declaring the official election results”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses voter registration procedures and identifying information requirements for mail registrations. It contains no provisions regarding voting system source code accessibility, certification authority access, vendor disclosure, academic review, or any related topic to software verifiability.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section of Connecticut election law concerns the availability and distribution of preliminary voter registry lists to candidates and the public. It does not address software, binary reproducibility, builds, or any technical requirement related to election systems or voting technology. The criterion concerns reproducible builds of election software, which is entirely outside the scope of this statute section.

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute requires that ballot layout models be available for public inspection before printing, which addresses publication of ballot layouts. However, the section does not require that these materials be signed, does not address tabulation rules, and does not explicitly require publication before polls open (only before printing absentee ballots). The requirement is limited to absentee ballots and does not comprehensively cover the full scope of the criterion.

“A layout model of each different absentee ballot shall be available for public inspection at the clerk's office prior to printing.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the examination and approval of voting tabulators by the Secretary of State, including requirements for accuracy, efficiency, and compliance with standards, as well as prohibition of hole-punch voting systems. It does not address verification that the actual running binary code matches a previously committed or publicly disclosed version, which is the core requirement for post-election software integrity checks.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses documentation of voter challenges by the moderator, requiring recordkeeping of challenge details and the moderator's decision. It does not address observer access, observer rights, or observer procedural participation in election proceedings. The statute is silent on whether party or civil-society observers are given procedural access to any aspect of the election process.

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute requires transmission of vote tabulation results to the Secretary of the State within 48 hours, which falls short of the 24-hour requirement for a score of 5. However, it exceeds the 1-week threshold and meets the 48-hour standard (score 4). The preliminary list must be transmitted by midnight on election day, but the duplicate list—which appears to be the official tabulation—has the 48-hour deadline.

“The moderator shall transmit such duplicate list to the Secretary of the State by electronic means as prescribed by the Secretary of the State not later than forty-eight hours after the close of the polls on election day.”

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute permits different voting tabulators to be provided for different voting districts, which could theoretically involve multiple vendors. However, the section does not explicitly permit or require multiple certified vendors to operate simultaneously in the same election within a single voting district or municipality-wide, nor does it mandate vendor diversity. The provision allows variation by district but does not establish multi-vendor capability as a requirement or guarantee.

“Different voting tabulators may be provided for different voting districts in the same municipality.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses preclearance requirements for election policies in Connecticut municipalities, focusing on voting access, districting, and anti-discrimination compliance. It contains no provisions regarding vote-format or device-protocol standards, nor does it address whether such standards are open or publicly documented. The section is entirely unrelated to vendor independence or technical standards for voting equipment.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses business entity campaign contributions and political committee regulations under Connecticut campaign finance law. It contains no provisions regarding vendor contracts, contract duration caps, or procurement practices. The section is entirely focused on limiting contributions and expenditures by business entities in political campaigns.

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute prohibits acts that invade or interfere with voting secrecy and imposes criminal penalties, demonstrating legal protection and enforceability. However, it does not affirmatively guarantee or establish ballot secrecy procedures; it only penalizes violations. The criterion asks whether voter–ballot unlinkability is 'legally guaranteed,' which requires a positive mandate, not merely prohibitions against interference.

“does any act which invades or interferes with the secrecy of the voting or causes the same to be invaded or interfered with, shall be guilty of a class D felony”

The statute mandates accessibility standards specifically for persons with physical disabilities at every polling place, addressing motor accessibility through door widths, ramps, handrails, and unobstructed paths. However, it does not comprehensively address vision or language accessibility requirements, and contains a waiver provision allowing non-accessible sites if no accessible alternative exists within the voting district.

“each polling place shall be made accessible to and usable by persons with physical disabilities by complying with the following standards of accessibility”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the casting and verification of provisional ballots, including documentation, envelope procedures, and voter verification mechanisms. It does not establish any legal floor or minimum standard for polling-place density, the number of polling places per voter, or geographic distribution of polling locations.