EDRIElection Dispute Resolution Index

The statute explicitly enumerates standing as a binary category: 'any five (5) qualified electors of the political subdivision' have standing to contest an election on indebtedness questions. The standing requirement is clearly codified with a specific numerical threshold (5 electors) and a defined eligibility class (qualified electors). This is a precise, enumerated standard rather than discretionary or vague language. While the enumeration is limited to this specific type of election (indebtedness creation), the criterion asks whether parties with standing are enumerated in statute, and they are.

“Any five (5) qualified electors of the political subdivision may contest an election on the question of the creation of an indebtedness upon filing in the district court of any county in which the political subdivision is wholly or partially located, within fourteen (14) days after the result of the election shall have been determined”

Wyoming Statute § 22-17-102 explicitly specifies that election contests must be filed 'with the clerk of the district court of the county.' This clearly designates the district court of the county as the court of original jurisdiction for election contests. The statute unambiguously identifies both the court level (district court) and the geographic jurisdiction (the county). This satisfies the criterion by providing a codified, specific venue and jurisdictional rule that leaves no discretion or ambiguity regarding where such contests must be filed.

“Election contests for all primary election offices and all general election offices other than state legislators, United States president and vice-president and presidential elector, may be commenced by the contestant filing with the clerk of the district court of the county”

Wyoming Statute § 22-17-110 expressly specifies a filing deadline for election contests of state legislators: within 30 days after certification by the state canvassing board. The deadline is clearly tied to a defined event (certification by the state canvassing board) and is codified in statute. The statute further requires that a copy of the notice of contest be filed with the secretary of state within the same 30-day period. This satisfies the criterion because it establishes a bright-line deadline with reference to a specific triggering event, enabling prompt resolution and clear procedural guidance.

“A contest of the election of a member of the state legislature shall be commenced within thirty (30) days after his election has been certified by the state canvassing board”

The statute codifies a procedural mechanism for evidence-gathering (depositions and compulsory process) by reference to civil action standards. It establishes that depositions may be taken and witnesses/evidence may be compelled. However, the section does not establish a codified standard of proof (e.g., clear and convincing evidence, preponderance, or other burden standard) for election contests themselves, nor does it codify specific admissibility rules beyond the general incorporation of civil procedure. The statute delegates to civil procedure rather than stating evidentiary rules directly. Under the scoring rubric, this satisfies the 'standard set' criterion (score 1) but falls short of 'standard + evidentiary rules' (score 2) because specific evidentiary rules are not independently codified in this section or, based on its text alone, delineated for election contests.

“Depositions shall be taken as in a civil action and the officer taking depositions has the power to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of papers, objects, and other evidence, by subpoena.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses retabulation, not the recount procedure itself. It establishes that retabulation is discretionary with the county clerk and that a recount 'under W.S. 22-16-109(a) shall be conducted' if retabulation differences affect results, but the actual recount procedure—who counts, how the count is performed, what evidence or standards apply, chain of custody, observer rights, and other procedural details—is delegated to W.S. 22-16-109(a). The statutory text here does not codify recount procedures; it merely cross-references another statute. Without access to § 22-16-109(a), we cannot assess whether recount procedures are adequately defined in statute, but this specific section fails to define them and instead defers to another provision.

No matching sections in corpus.

Wyoming Statute § 22-16-113 provides explicit statutory allocation of recount costs contingent on outcome. The statute codifies two clear scenarios: (1) if the recount reveals sufficient error to change the election result, the county pays all expenses and returns the deposit; (2) if the recount does not change the result, the applicant pays actual costs up to the deposited amount. Additionally, the statute specifies deposit amounts based on vote differential (§ 500 for 1-5% difference, $3,000 for 5%+ difference) and mandates that county clerks issue complete accounting with refund of any surplus. The statute further provides that county-initiated or statutorily-required recounts are paid by the county regardless of outcome. This satisfies RECT.3 because cost allocation is unambiguously codified by statute and is outcome-dependent, leaving no discretion to administrators or courts.

“If the recount shows sufficient error to change the result of the election, the county in which the recount is taken shall pay expenses of the recount and the deposit shall be returned. Otherwise the applicant or applicants seeking the recount shall be liable for the actual cost of conducting the recount up to a maximum of the amount deposited under subsection (a) of this section, per county recounted.”

Wyoming Stat. § 22-16-112 explicitly codifies the legal effect of a recount finding: when a recount reveals a different vote count, that recount result becomes 'the official result.' This is a binding, mandatory legal effect that mandates amendment of the certified election result. The statute does not leave the recount's legal consequence to judicial discretion or canvassing board discretion—the statutory language 'shall be the official result' creates an automatic, binding obligation. The section also codifies the timing requirement (72-hour certification deadline), further clarifying the procedural framework. This satisfies the criterion because the effect of a recount finding is clearly defined in statutory text.

“If the recount indicates a different vote, the result of the recount shall be the official result.”

The statute specifies that certification occurs 'immediately after' the polls close and that results 'shall be certified' to the clerk. This establishes a certification procedure and trigger. However, the criterion requires a specific DEADLINE for when results become official—a fixed date or timeframe (e.g., 'by 5 p.m. on election day' or 'within three business days'). The phrase 'immediately after' is temporal but discretionary and lacks the statutory precision expected for procedural clarity. The section does not specify when certification is complete or when results formally become 'official' for contest/challenge purposes. The statute addresses bond-election ballots specifically, not general election certification timelines, further limiting its applicability to the broader certification deadline criterion.

“Immediately after the closing of the polls, the counting board shall proceed to count the ballots. The results disclosed by the count shall be certified by the counting board to the clerk of the political subdivision.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This statute addresses referendum petitions and the suspension of ordinances following certification by a municipal clerk. It does not establish a mechanism to stay certification of election results while a recount or election contest is pending. The statute concerns the administrative sufficiency review of referendum petitions, not post-election dispute resolution procedures or certification stays. The section does not codify any process for suspending or staying the certification of election results during the pendency of a recount or contest challenge.