Switzerlandv0

EIIElection Integrity Index

How well does the legal framework defend against vote-altering attacks?

Integrity7.5%4/53 · 29 datapoints · 7 dimensionsCompare across jurisdictions →

Dimensions

Citizen Verifiability12.5%
1/8 · 4 datapoints
Custody Hardware0.0%
0/8 · 4 datapoints
Post Election Audit0.0%
0/9 · 5 datapoints
Software Verifiability0.0%
0/9 · 5 datapoints
Transparency Observation25.0%
2/8 · 4 datapoints
Vendor Independence0.0%
0/4 · 4 datapoints
Voter Access14.3%
1/7 · 3 datapoints

Citizen Verifiability

12.5% · 1/8
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
4.1Public verification artifactDoes law mandate a downloadable public package containing certificates, device records, and result signatures?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 52 of the Swiss Federal Political Rights Act requires publication of election results in official bulletins and transmission of election protocols, but does not mandate a downloadable public package containing certificates, device records, or result signatures. The provision addresses transparency through publication and complaint procedures, not the specific technical artifacts required by criterion 4.1.

§ view source
2026-06-17
4.2End-to-end verifiability permittedDoes law permit (or require) per-voter cryptographic receipts that prove inclusion without revealing the vote?0/50.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-17
4.3Voter-verifiable paper trailIs voter-verifiable paper record (VVPAT or hand-marked paper) legally required?1/1100.0%

The statute requires that a protocol (record) be created for each voting booth documenting the results of voting, including ballot counts and vote tallies. This establishes a legally mandated paper record of voting outcomes that can be verified and audited, satisfying the requirement for a voter-verifiable paper trail.

“Über das Ergebnis einer Abstimmung wird in jedem Stimmbüro ein Protokoll erstellt, das die Gesamtzahl der Stimmberechtigten und die Zahl der stimmberechtigten Auslandschweizer, der Stimmenden, der leeren, ungültigen und gültigen Stimmzettel sowie der Ja- und Nein-Stimmen angibt.”
§ view source
2026-06-17
4.4Citizen re-tally rightCan any citizen — not just parties — legally re-tally from published precinct data?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-17

Custody Hardware

0.0% · 0/8
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
2.1Hardware tamper standardAre tamper-evident or tamper-responsive hardware standards mandated?0/50.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-17
2.2Network isolation mandateIs internet/Wi-Fi/cellular connectivity legally prohibited on vote-casting equipment?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 92 of the Swiss Federal Political Rights Act (BPR) addresses only the referendum procedure and the date of entry into force of the statute (1 July 1978). It contains no provisions regarding voting equipment, network connectivity, internet access, or any technical specifications related to vote-casting devices. This section is entirely procedural and does not address election integrity safeguards.

§ view source
2026-06-17
2.3Custody documentationIs full chain-of-custody documentation required and publicly available?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-17
2.4Tamper criminal penaltyAre there explicit criminal penalties for unauthorized device access?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 60 BPR concerns signature list requirements for referenda, including warnings about falsifying signature collection results and bribery in the signature collection process. It does not address criminal penalties for unauthorized access to devices or hardware, which is the subject matter of criterion 2.4 on custody hardware security.

§ view source
2026-06-17

Post Election Audit

0.0% · 0/9
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
3.1Mandatory auditIs a post-election audit legally required for every election?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the determination of referendum results and specifies when a recount is required (only if irregularities are credibly established and could substantially affect the result). It does not establish a mandatory post-election audit requirement for every election, nor does it apply to elections as opposed to referendums. The provision is about recounting votes under specific circumstances, not systematic auditing.

§ view source
2026-06-17
3.2Audit methodWhat audit method is mandated?0/50.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the determination of elected candidates and alternates based on vote counts, using tie-breaking procedures by lot. It does not address post-election audits or any audit methodology. The section is about candidate selection, not election integrity auditing.

§ view source
2026-06-17
3.3Audit triggers beyond mandatoryDoes law trigger additional audits on close margins or sworn challenges?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 80 of BPR concerns appeals to the Federal Court against decisions by cantonal governments and federal chancellery regarding party registration, initiatives, and referendums. It addresses the jurisdiction and procedure for bringing complaints, not post-election audit triggers or mechanisms for auditing close margins or sworn challenges.

§ view source
2026-06-17
3.4Public observation of auditAre parties, media, and citizens granted observer access to the audit?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-17
3.5Binding forceAre audit results legally binding on the final certified result?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 43 of the BPR addresses the determination of elected candidates and alternates based on votes received, using vote counts and lot-drawing for tie-breaking. It does not address post-election audits, audit procedures, or the legal binding force of audit results on certified election outcomes.

§ view source
2026-06-17

Software Verifiability

0.0% · 0/9
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
1.1Source code disclosureIs voting system source code legally accessible?0/50.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-17
1.2Reproducible builds requirementMust the binary that runs in production be reproducibly buildable from public source?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-17
1.3Pre-election binary commitmentIs the running binary cryptographically committed (hash published) before polls open?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-17
1.4Election definition publicationAre ballot contests, layouts, and tabulation rules signed and published before polls open?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 5 of BPR establishes general principles for voting methods and ballot handling (use of official ballots, secrecy requirements, proxy provisions). It does not address publication, signing, or pre-election disclosure of ballot contests, layouts, or tabulation rules—topics that criterion 1.4 requires.

§ view source
2026-06-17
1.5Post-election integrity checkDoes law grant a right to verify the actual running binary matches the committed one?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the determination of elected candidates and alternates based on vote counts and lot-drawing in case of tie votes. It concerns candidate selection and ranking procedures, not software verification, cryptographic commitment, or binary code integrity verification. The criterion requires a legal right to verify that election software matches a committed version, which is entirely absent from this section.

§ view source
2026-06-17

Transparency Observation

25.0% · 2/8
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
6.1Domestic observer rightsAre party and civil-society observers given full procedural access?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the transmission and publication of preliminary voting results by cantonal authorities to federal bodies and the public. It contains no provisions regarding observer rights, procedural access for party observers, or civil-society observer credentials. The criterion concerns observer access to voting procedures; this section is about result reporting timelines and data specifications.

§ view source
2026-06-17
6.2International observer accessAre OSCE/EU/IFES international observers admitted by default?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-17
6.3Precinct-level results publication speedAre precinct-level results legally required to be published within 24h of poll close?2/540.0%

The section requires the cantonal government to publish the election protocol 'sofort' (immediately) in the official gazette, which indicates prompt publication. However, 'sofort' is vague and does not establish a specific legal timeframe of 24 or 48 hours. The term suggests expedited publication but falls short of a binding 24-hour requirement, making it align more with a general 'within one week' standard.

“Die Kantonsregierung veröffentlicht den Inhalt des Wahlprotokolls ohne ihre Bemerkungen und Entscheide sofort im kantonalen Amtsblatt.”
§ view source
2026-06-17
6.4Public election event logIs a public, signed, append-only election event log legally required?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-17

Vendor Independence

0.0% · 0/4
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
5.1Multi-vendor capabilityDoes law permit multiple certified vendors to operate in the same election?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-17
5.2Open protocol standardsAre vote-format / device-protocol standards open and publicly documented?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-17
5.3Contract duration capAre vendor contracts capped in duration, preventing perpetual lock-in?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-17
5.4Source-code escrowIs source-code escrow with the state required as a condition of certification?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-17

Voter Access

14.3% · 1/7
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
7.1Ballot secrecy guaranteeIs voter–ballot unlinkability legally guaranteed and enforceable?1/1100.0%

The section explicitly guarantees ballot secrecy as a legally binding principle that cannot be impaired. This directly addresses the requirement for voter-ballot unlinkability by establishing an enforceable legal prohibition on any action that would compromise the secrecy of the vote.

“Das Stimmgeheimnis darf nicht beeinträchtigt werden.”
§ view source
2026-06-17
7.2Accessibility mandateAre accessibility standards (vision, motor, language) legally required at every polling place?0/50.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-17
7.3Polling-place density floorIs there a legal floor on polling places per N voters or per geographic area?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-17

Other methodologies for Switzerland